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Abstract:

Article 48 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights opens the door for
singeing the Covenant by, inter alia, any member State in any of the United Nations specialized agencies. After the membership of Palestine, as a State, in the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization on 31 October 2011, the possibility
for Palestine of becoming party to the Covenant is now open. In order to be party to
the Covenant, Palestine needs to be prepared. It should launch a process of reforming
existing legislation in line with international human rights law, starting with the said
Covenant. This paper offers an example of the required legislative reform by focusing
on Article 4 of the Covenant and analyzing it in comparison with the state of emergency
provisions of the 2003 Palestinian Basic Law.

امللخ�ص

:

 من العهد الدويل اخلا�ص باحلقوق املدنية وال�سيا�سية الباب للتوقيع على العهد لأي دولة ع�ضو يف �أي48 تفتح املادة
 يف منظمة الأمم املتحدة للرتبية والعلوم، كدولة، بعد ع�ضوية فل�سطني.من الوكاالت املتخ�ص�صة التابعة للأمم املتحدة
، باعتبارها وكالة من الوكاالت املتخ�ص�صة التابعة للمنظمة الدولية الأم2011  �أكتوبر/ ت�رشين الأول31 والثقافة يف
 حتتاج فل�سطني، ومن �أجل �أن تكون طرفا يف ذلك العهد.�أ�صبح ممكنا لدولة فل�سطني �أن ت�صبح طرفا يف هذا العهد الدويل
 فيتعني على فل�سطني �أن تطلق عملية �إ�صالح للت�رشيعات القائمة مبا يتما�شى.�إىل �أن تكون م�ستعدة على خمتلف الأ�صعدة
 تقدم هذه الورقة مثاال على الإ�صالح الت�رشيعي املطلوب من. بدءا من العهد املذكور،مع القانون الدويل حلقوق الإن�سان
خالل الرتكيز على املادة الرابعة من العهد وحتليلها باملقارنة مع �أحكام حالة الطوارئ الواردة يف القانون الأ�سا�سي
.2003 الفل�سطيني املعدل لعام
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Introduction
Article 48, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights of 16 December 1966 (ICCPR)1
provided that the ‘present Covenant is
open for signature by any State Member of the United Nations or member
of any of its specialized agencies . . .
.’2With the membership of Palestine
in the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), as one of the United Nations (UN) specialized agencies3, on 31
October 20114, the possibility for the
‘State of Palestine’ to become party to
the ICCPR, and to a number of other
treaties, has become open.
After its establishment, the State of Palestine would have many rights under
various branches of international law. It
could join international courts, regional
and global organizations, become party
to treaties, establish full-fledged diplomatic relations, enter into alliances with
other States, enact Palestinian nationality law, issue passports and protect its
citizens abroad. Palestinian officials
and scholars do focus on such rights5.
What is absent so far, however, is the
discussion about the obligations of the
State. This paper tries to fill in this gap
by tackling one obligation arising from
a major instrument, namely Article 4
of the ICCPR relating to the state of
emergency, as an example of such obligations.Since its adoption in 1966, and
in particular after coming into force in
1977, massive jurisprudence has been
developed in addressing State duties
under the ICCPR, both at the academic
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level and as part of the work of the Human Rights Committee that monitors
the implementation of the Covenant. It
would be therefore of little theoretical
or practical benefit to revisit the interpretations of the ICCPR and the general
obligations that it poses6. Yet the issue
is much more interesting once it comes
to the obligations of new States, such as
Palestine, as national policies, legislation and institutions should be reevaluated in the light of the Covenant. Thus
while the State of Palestine would
strengthen its international stand by becoming party to key treaties, it should
be aware of the actions that it needs to
adhere to as part of this process.The
state of emergency in Palestine has
been regulated by the Amended Basic
Law of 18 March 20037, Articles 1101138. The ICCPR addressed the state
of emergency in Article 4. We will first
insert Article 4 and the aforementioned
articles of the Basic Law in full in order to pave the way for the assessment
of the Palestinian provisions in light
of ICCPR. Gaps in the state of emergency system that exists in Palestine
as manifested in decrees and decisions
that followed the presidential decree,
by which the Palestinian Authority proclaimed the state of emergency on 14
June 20079, would be identified. Ways
of reforming the existing system would
be then proposed.
Text
Article 4 of the ICCPR on the state of
emergency reads as follows:
‘1. In time of public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation and the
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existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the
present Covenant to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are
not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do
not involve discrimination solely on the
ground of race, colour, sex, language,
religion or social origin.
2. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8
(paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18
may be made under this provision.
3. Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of
derogation shall immediately inform
the other States Parties to the present
Covenant, through the intermediary of
the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, of the provisions from which
it has derogated and of the reasons by
which it was actuated. A further communication shall be made, through
the same intermediary, on the date on
which it terminates such derogation.’
The provisions of the state of emergency in the Basic Law of 2003 are the
following:
Article 110
‘1. The President of the National Authority may declare a state of emergency by decree when there is a threat
to national security caused by war, invasion, armed insurrection or in times
of natural disaster, for a period not to
exceed thirty days.
2. The state of emergency may be extended for another period of thirty days
if a two-thirds majority of the members
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of the Legislative Council vote in favor
of the extension.
3. The decree declaring a state of emergency shall state its purpose, the region
to which it applies and its duration.
4. The Legislative Council shall have
the right to review all or some of the
procedures and measures adopted during the state of emergency, at the first
session convened after the declaration
of the state of emergency or in the extension session, whichever comes earlier, and to conduct the necessary interpellation in this regard.’
Article 111
‘It is not allowed to impose restrictions
on fundamental rights and freedoms
when declaring a state of emergency
except to the extent necessary to fulfill
the purpose stated in the decree declaring the state of emergency.’
Article 112
‘Any arrest resulting from the declaration of a state of emergency shall be
subject to the following minimum requirements:
1. Any detention carried out pursuant
to a state of emergency decree shall be
reviewed by the Attorney General, or
by the appropriate court, within a time
period not to exceed fifteen days from
the date of detention.
2. The detained individual shall have
the right to appoint a lawyer.’
Article 113
‘The Palestinian Legislative Council
may not be dissolved or its work hindered during a state of emergency, nor
shall the provisions of this title be sus-
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pended.’
While the above Article 110 and 113
dealt with the institution that is in
charge of declaring the state of emergency as well as the emergency’s period, geographical limitation and the role
of the Legislative Council with regard
to the emergency, Articles 111 and 112
relate to the rights that might be derogated from during the emergency situation. Articles 110 and 113, it can be
said, focused on procedural aspects of
the state of emergency’s proclamation;
Articles 111 and 112 are relative to substance.
Procedural Aspects
Article 110, paragraph 1, of the Basic
Law stated that the ‘President of the
National Authority may declare a state
of emergency by decree when there is
a threat to national security caused by
war, invasion, armed insurrection or in
times of natural disaster, for a period
not exceeding thirty days.’ This provision seems to be consistent with Article 4, paragraph 3, of the ICCPR as the
State that declares emergency should
specify ‘the date on which it terminates
such derogation;’ namely the state of
emergency itself, and the derogation
from certain rights thereof, should be
temporary. Paragraph 2 of Article 110
of the Basic Law adds extra assurance
by requiring that the ‘state of emergency may be extended for another period
of thirty days if a two-thirds majority of
the members of the Legislative Council votes in favor of the extension.’ The
two-third majority, which is equivalent
to the vote required for the amend-
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ment of the Basic Law10, implies that
the extension of the state of emergency
amounts to the level of constitutional
amendment. However, Article 110 does
not answer the question on the possibility of extending the state of emergency
when the situation that led to the proclamation of the emergency continues
beyond the sixty-day periods fixed in
the Basic Law. Nor the said article is
offering a solution for the possibility of
extending the state of emergency when
the Legislative Council is absent due
to the emergency itself or due to other
situations that prevents the Council to
convene.
It appears that the thirty-day requirement of Article 110 has been respected
when the President of the Palestinian Authority proclaimed the state of
emergency for the first time on 5 October 200311, and, more clearly, in the
second time on 14 June 200712. By a
closer look at the matter, however, one
may conclude otherwise. The reason of
this conclusion is twofold. Firstly, the
aforementioned 2003 decree was only
published in the official gazette almost
four months after its proclamation, that
is on 29 January 200413, while the 2007
decree was gazetted nearly two months
after its adoption, namely on 9 August
200714. In both instances, the state of
emergency was made public, as far as
the official publication is concerned,
after the lapse of the thirty-day period
of the state of emergency specified in
Article 110 of the Basic Law. Secondly,
most of the measures that were taken
during the period of the state of emergency that was declared on 14 June
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2007 produced ongoing legal effects
that lasted after the declared period.
These measures include, for example,
naming a new cabinet/council of ministers15, referring cases of civilians to
military courts16, ceasing the application of a number of articles of the Basic Law17, shutting down or restricting
the work of a number of existing civil
society organizations18, and dismissing
or ‘ending the appointment’ of certain
categories of public servants19. Most of
these measures have continued for over
five years after the declaration of the
state of emergency, even until the time
of writing these lines (June 2012).
Article 110, paragraph 3, of the Basic
Law added that the ‘decree declaring a
state of emergency shall state its purpose, the region to which it applies and
its duration.’ This paragraph seems to
be consistent with the ICCPR’s proviso
(Article 4, paragraph 3) that the State
that proclaims emergency should specify the ‘reasons’ of that proclamation.
The aforesaid two decrees by which the
President of the Palestinian Authority
proclaimed the state of emergency have
observed such requirements; the reason/purpose of the state of emergency
was included therein. For example, Decree No. 10 of 14 June 2007 mentioned
that the reason of the state of emergency’s proclamation is the ‘criminal war
in the Gaza Strip and the takeover of
the institutions of the Palestinian National Authority20.’ It also specified
the region in which the emergency was
proclaimed, i.e. ‘the territory of the
Palestinian National Authority.21’ Yet,
according to the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 29 of
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24 July 200122, the reason included
in the said Decree No. 10 is not sufficient. States should ‘provide careful
justification not only for their decision
to proclaim a state of emergency but
also for any specific measures based on
such a proclamation. If States purport
to invoke the right to derogate from the
Covenant during, for instance, a natural catastrophe, a mass demonstration
including instances of violence, or a
major industrial accident, they must be
able to justify not only that such a situation constitutes a threat to the life of
the nation, but also that all their measures derogating from the Covenant are
strictly required by the exigencies of
the situation.’23 Therefore, Palestine,
for the purpose of being consistent with
the ICCPR, should set out the reasons
behind issuing all decrees and decisions
that were enacted during or pursuant to
the proclamation of the state of emergency; this has not been fulfilled.
Article 110, paragraph 4, and Article
113 of the Basic Law added guarantees
for the Palestinian Legislative Council
to review measures adopted during the
state of emergency, the non-dissolution
of the Council at the time of emergency, and the non-suspension of the Basic
Law’s provisions relating to the state of
emergency. Yet suspending, by a presidential decree24, articles of the Basic
Law on the power of the Legislative
Council to give confidence to the new
government that has been formed during the state of emergency effectively
leads to the dissolution of the Council25.
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Substantive Aspects
The framework on the rights that might
be restricted during period of the state
of emergency was set forth in Article 111 of the Palestinian Basic Law,
which reads: ‘It is not allowed to impose restrictions on fundamental rights
and freedoms when declaring a state of
emergency except to the extent necessary to fulfill the purpose stated in the
decree declaring the state of emergency’. This provision’s language is problematic. It is vague, leaves the door
open for conflicting interpretations:
what is meant by ‘restriction,’ ‘fundamental rights and freedoms,’ or ‘extent
necessary’? In no applicable legislation in Palestine one could find precise
definition to such expressions, leaving
a free hand for the Executive Power to
violate any human right.
Article 112 of the Basic Law provided
more concrete example on one right
that might be derogated from, i.e. arrest/detention. The article stated, in its
paragraph 1, that any ‘detention carried
out pursuant to a state of emergency decree shall be reviewed by the Attorney
General, or by the appropriate court,
within a time period not to exceeding
fifteen days from the date of detention.’
Paragraph 2 of the same article gave the
detainee ‘the right to appoint a lawyer.’
This article permits detention for fifteen
days without fair trial guarantees, with
the exception of the right to appoint a
lawyer. Who knows what would happen during the fifteen days of interrogation with the absence of a prosecutor or a judge. It would be even worse
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when cases of civilians are transferred,
presumably after fifteen days, to the
military court to be tried by a military
officer and based on revolutionary laws
and procedures26.
The right of fair trial is a peremptory
norm of international law that should
be respected by all States27. This is apparent from the clause that allowed derogation from certain rights in light of
‘other obligations under international
law’ inserted in Article 4, paragraph 1,
of the ICCPR. In its General Comment
No. 20 of 24 July 200128, the Human
Rights Committee made a clear reference to such obligation by saying that
‘States parties may in no circumstances
invoke article 4 of the Covenant as justification for acting in violation of . . .
peremptory norms of international law,
for instance by . . . arbitrary deprivations of liberty or by deviating from
fundamental principles of fair trial29.’
And as ‘certain elements of the right to
a fair trial are explicitly guaranteed under international humanitarian law during armed conflict, the Committee finds
no justification for derogation from
these guarantees during other emergency situations. The Committee is of
the opinion that the principles of legality and the rule of law require that fundamental requirements of fair trial must
be respected during a state of emergency. Only a court of law may try and
convict a person. . . . In order to protect
non-derogable rights, the right to take
proceedings before a court to enable
the court to decide without delay on the
lawfulness of detention, must not be diminished by a State party’s decision to
derogate from the Covenant.30’
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Article 4, paragraph 2, of the ICCPR
does not allow the derogation from the
following articles of the Covenant: Article 6 on the right to life, Article 7 on
the prohibition of torture or medical or
scientific experimentation without consent, Article 8, paragraphs 1 and 2, on
the prohibition of slavery, Article 11
on the prohibition of imprisonment because of inability to fulfill a contractual
obligation, Article 15 on the principle
of legality in the field of criminal law,
Article 16 on the recognition of everyone as a person before the law, and Article 18 on the freedom of thought, conscience and religion31. There is no clear
guarantee, from the wording of Article
111 of the Palestinian Basic Law, for
the respect of these rights. There was
no reference in the Decree of 14 June
2007 to specific rights that would be
suspended32. In practice one can find,
by reviewing the decrees and decisions
that were enacted by the Palestinian
President or Prime Minister pursuant to
the proclamation of the state of emergency, serious concerns on a number of
rights that were effectively restricted.
Presidential Decree No. 11 of 200733,
for example, effectively paralyzed the
role of the Palestinian Parliament in
monitoring the performance of the Executive Power by suspending the provision of the Basic Law (Article 79)
relating to confidence in government34.
Presidential Decree No. 17 of 200735
too, vested the Minister of Interior with
absolute power ‘to take any measure
that he thinks fit’ against civil society
institutions, including shutting down
or relicensing any association. Prime
Minister’s Decision No. 20 of 2007,
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from its side, established basis for dismissing public employees. And Presidential Decree No. 28 of 2007, lastly,
referred to certain ‘crimes’ committed
by civilians to military court. The latter
decree, in turn, referred in its preamble to a number of statutes that are often characterized as anti-human rights,
such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Revolutionary Penal
Law of 1979, the PLO Revolutionary
Criminal Procedures Law of 1979, and
Military Order No. 555 of 1959 regarding the Crimes against State Security39.
By officially blocking the functions of
the Parliament as well as restricting a
number of rights and referring cases involving civilians to the military courts;
these measures indicate that the Palestinian Authority has permitted itself
to violate any right during the state of
emergency without effective oversight
from the legislator or the judiciary. This
conclusion would make it useful for
the Palestinian legislator, in order to
conform to international human rights
standards in the projected State, to
adopt the measures indicated in Article
4 of the ICCPR. Such measures would:
(1) give flexibility to the government
regarding the time limit for the state of
emergency which might require longer
period that exceed the thirty days fixed
in the Basic Law, (2) avoid the vacuum
for extending the state of emergency
when the Parliament is unable to convene, and, at the same time, (3) guarantee the respect of specific fundamental
rights listed in Article 4, paragraph 2, of
the ICCPR from which no derogation
would be permitted. After becoming
party to the ICCPR, Palestine would
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become under the obligation of Article
4, paragraph 3, of the Covenant that requires immediate notification to other
States parties to the Covenant through
the intermediary of the UN SecretaryGeneral. In such notification, Palestine
should indicate the provisions from
which it has derogated40. The purpose
of this notification, among other things,
is to inform other States of the provisions it has derogated from in order to
‘permit other States parties to monitor
compliance with the provisions of the
Covenant.41’
Palestine, furthermore, needs to observe
other recommendations of the Human
Rights Committee as introduced in
General Comment No. 29 of 24 July
2001 regarding the derogation during
the state of emergency42, and adjusting
its legislation accordingly. Palestine
should add to its legislation a provision providing remedies for any human
rights violation, even if such violation
is resulted from the legal measures taken during the state of emergency. This
proposed clause ‘constitutes a treaty
obligation inherent in the Covenant as
a whole. Even if a State party, during
a state of emergency, and to the extent
that such measures are strictly required
by the exigencies of the situation, may
introduce adjustments to the practical
functioning of its procedures governing judicial or other remedies, the State
party must comply with the fundamental obligation . . . of the Covenant to
provide a remedy that is effective43.’
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Conclusion
Similar provisions to that of Article
48, paragraph 1, of the ICCPR exist
explicitly in five other international human rights treaties, namely: (1) International Convention for the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) of 21 December 196544, Article 17, paragraph 1; (2) International
Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights of 16 December 196645,
Article 26, paragraph 1; (3) First Optional Protocol to ICCPR of 16 December 196646, Article 8, paragraph 1; (4)
Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR
Aiming at the Abolition of the Death
Penalty of 15 December 198947, Article
7, paragraph 1; (5) Additional Protocol
to the International Covenant on Economic and Social and Cultural Rights
of 10 December 200848, Article, 17,
paragraph 1. Other human rights treaties do not include explicit provision
that permits a member State of a UN
specialized agency to join such instruments. The reason of this, probably, is
that in the sixties of the twentieth century, at the time when the two international covenants and the CERD were
adopted, there has been still a number
of States that were non-members of the
UN but members in one or more of Organization’s specialized agencies; the
very situation in which Palestine is undergoing at present before acquiring a
full UN membership.
By becoming party to such instruments,
Palestine would gain further legitimacy bases that do not exist at present.
Palestine would appear as a State that
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respects human rights and as a ‘peaceloving’ at the global level, especially
since four of the aforementioned conventions form the ‘International Bill
of Human Rights.’ This would, in turn,
strengthen the Palestinian position
when it pursues its application to the
full UN membership. As a State party,
Palestine can nominate experts in the
committees based on such treaties. The
State may influence international lawmaking and prove its existence as an
independent State officially as part of
such committees’ processes. Palestine,
like any other State, cannot be represented at the committees, or treatybased bodies, without being party to
such treaties. Joining the two covenants
and the CERD is an effective accession
to three international separate organizations: the first organization is the ‘Human Rights Committee,’ the second is
the ‘Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights,’ and the third is the
‘Committee against Racial Discrimination.’ At the same time, the State of Palestine should be prepared to carry on
the obligations set forth in international
human rights treaties and change its
legislation and policies and reform its
institutions accordingly in order to be
a member of the community of States
that respects human rights.
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The Experience of the European Convention on
Human Rights,’ 9 Yale Journal of World Public
Order 113 (1983).
32. Op cit.
33. Op. cit.
34. Also Decree No. 8 of 17 June 2007 Concerning the Suspension of the Enforcement of the

245

Provisions under Article 79 [of the Basic Law],
Palestine Gazette, No. 71, 9 August 2007, p. 9.
35. Op. cit.
36. Also Decision No. 8 of 20 June 2007 [by the
Prime Minister] Concerning Associations and
[Civil Society] Bodies, Palestine Gazette, No.
71, 9 August 2007, p. 47.
37. Op. cit.
38. Op. cit.
39. Cf. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ‘Fundamental
Rights During A Proclamation of Emergency:
The Indian Experience,’ 12 Student Advocate
24 (2000); Venkat lyer, ‘States of Emergency Moderating Their Effects on Human Rights,’ 22
Dalhousie Law Journal 125 (1999); L.C. Green,
‘Derogation of Human Rights in Emergency Situations,’ 16 Canadian Yearbook of International
Law (1978).
40. See Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 628/1995 (Tae Hoon Park v. Republic
of Korea); in Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Selected Decisions of the
Human Rights Committee under the Optional
Protocol, Vol. 6, 2005, p. 153. In this regard, the
Human Rihts Committee noted that ‘the State
party has not made the declaration under article
4 (3) of the Covenant that a public emergency
existed and that it derogated certain Covenant
rights on this basis’ (p. 157).
41. General Comment No. 29 of 2001, op. cit.,
paragraph 17.
42. Op. cit.
43. Paragraph 14.
44. 666 UNTS 195 (1971).
45. 993 UNTS 3 (1983).
46. 999 UNTS 302 (1976).
47. 1642 UNTS 404 (1999).
48. UN Doc. A/RES/63/117.
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